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FIQ-PQC04-SW Hardened ML‑KEM (FIPS 203) + ML‑DSA (FIPS 204) Post‑Quantum Cryptographic Software Library

Compact and Secure Post‑Quantum Cryptographic Library for Resource‑Constrained Devices

FortifyIQ’s FIQ‑PQC04‑SW provides a unified, hardened implementation of both ML‑KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism, FIPS 203) and ML‑DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm, FIPS 204), enabling secure key establishment and authentication in a single integrated software package.

The library supports all key sizes of both algorithms and incorporates comprehensive protections against Side‑Channel Attacks (SCA) and Fault Injection Attacks (FIA). The implementation is engineered to meet or exceed rigorous certification standards, including all levels of FIPS 140‑3 and SESIP, and Common Criteria AVA_VAN.5.

Features

Efficient Performance

  • Optimized for embedded and resource‑constrained environments
  • Low RAM footprint and compact code size
  • High software performance

Integrated SCA & FIA Protections

  • Algorithmic protection via redundant‑domain computation
  • Hardened implementations of sensitive operations
  • Significantly lower overhead than the common alternative (e.g. share-based)
  • Uniform protection architecture across both ML‑KEM and ML‑DSA

Security Certification Readiness

  • Designed for all evaluation levels of FIPS 140‑3 and Common Criteria
  • Fully aligned with FIPS 203 (ML‑KEM) and FIPS 204 (ML‑DSA)
  • NIST ACVP/CAVP certified cryptographic components
  • Suitable for OEMs requiring long‑term PQC compliance
Applications
  • IoT Devices
  • Automotive Systems
  • Embedded & Industrial Control
  • Authentication Tokens
  • Payment Systems
  • Secure Communications
  • Network Devices
  • Secure Boot & Firmware Signing
  • Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)
  • PQC‑ready SoCs and microcontrollers
Technical Overview

FIQ‑PQC04‑SW integrates FortifyIQ’s hardened implementations of both ML‑KEM and ML‑DSA:

ML‑KEM Module
Implements the standardized ML‑KEM key encapsulation algorithm (FIPS 203).
Protected against SCA and FIA with minimal performance overhead.

ML‑DSA Module
Implements the standardized ML‑DSA digital signature algorithm (FIPS 204).
Strong SCA and FIA protection with minimal performance overhead.

Unified Architecture

  • Shared protection framework across both algorithms
  • Highly configurable for performance/memory trade‑offs
  • Suitable for key establishment and agreement, as well as digital signature use cases, including secure boot, firmware signing, and authenticated communication.
External Dependencies
  • Requires a good entropy source, such as TRNG
  • No additional dependencies
  • Portable across multiple platforms
Deliverables
  • Full software library (ML‑KEM + ML‑DSA)
  • Integration documentation
  • API reference
  • Test vectors
  • Certification guidance package
Related Products
  • FIQ-PQC01C – ML-KEM Hardware IP Core
  • FIQ-PQC02C – ML-DSA Hardware IP Core
  • FIQ-PQC02-SW – ML-DSA Software Library
  • FIQ-PQC01-SW – ML-KEM Software Library
  • FIQ-BOX03B – PQCryptobox
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FortifyIQ AES Algorithm
AVA_VAN.5 Evaluation & Validation Summary
SGS Brightsight Common Criteria Laboratory
“Summary. The leakage analysis (Welch t-test) on over 30 million traces did not show statistically significant first- and second-order differences between trace sets with fixed and random inputs. The template-based DPA analysis, on the pseudo-random trace set for the profiling phase (15 million traces) and on a sub-set of 300k fix input traces for matching phase targeting the first-round S-box output, and template attack on ciphertext, did not indicate any potential information leakage.”
“The results for the soft IP presented in the report were obtained on the TOE which is the basic hardware implementation of the soft IP without additional levels of security (e.g. that are present in a secure silicon layout). Therefore the internal strength of the soft IP itself was evaluated. This indicates that the investigated features and parameters of the soft IP implementation should be robust against SCA and fault injection attacks in different implementations including ASIC. Nevertheless, according to the Common Criteria rules, the strength of the final composite product must be evaluated on its own”
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