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FIQ-PQC03-SW ML-DSA Compact Signature Verification Library

CAVP‑validated ML‑DSA verification (FIPS 204) with small code size and RAM usage for secure boot and firmware update authentication, compact enough for highly constrained embedded systems.

FIQ‑PQC03‑SW is a compact, verification‑only library of ML‑DSA (FIPS 204), the NIST‑standardized post‑quantum digital signature verification algorithm. It is used to verify signatures, optimal for secure boot and authenticated firmware updates on memory‑ and performance‑constrained MCUs and embedded platforms.

As long‑life and connected devices migrate to PQC/hybrid, manufacturers need a practical way to adopt post‑quantum signature verification. FIQ‑PQC03‑SW provides a drop‑in upgrade path from classical secure boot to ML‑DSA-based secure boot, with no hardware changes required.

Built for Embedded, Configurable for High Performance

The library is highly configurable and processor-agnostic, for area and performance tradeoffs across both resource-constrained endpoints and high-throughput environments:

  • Low‑cost 32‑bit MCU platforms (ARM Cortex‑M, RISC‑V)
  • High-performance CPUs, servers, and HPC/cloud endpoints (ARM64, x86)
  • Industrial control systems and SCADA endpoints
  • Automotive ECUs with tight memory budgets
  • Medical and consumer IoT devices

FIQ‑PQC03‑SW enables NIST‑standardized post‑quantum signature verification in secure boot flows, maintaining exceptional execution speed while minimizing RAM and flash/NVM requirements.

Standards Alignment

Supported Verification Algorithms and Security Levels

Parameter sets:

  • ML‑DSA‑44 (NIST security category 2)
  • ML‑DSA‑65 (NIST security category 3)
  • ML‑DSA‑87 (NIST security category 5)
Features
  • CAVP‑validated ML‑DSA verification library
  • Small code size and small RAM usage for highly memory‑constrained MCUs and embedded platforms
  • Verification‑only profile optimized for secure boot and firmware authentication
  • Deterministic verification behavior for predictable boot‑time performance
  • Designed for long‑life devices in industrial, automotive, medical, and energy sectors
  • Drop‑in upgrade path from RSA/ECC secure boot to ML‑DSA without hardware changes
Applications

Typical Applications and Targets

Secure boot & firmware integrity (primary use case)

  • Stage‑1 / stage‑2 bootloader verification
  • OTA/FOTA firmware authentication

Constrained embedded platforms

  • 32‑bit MCUs (Cortex‑M, RISC-V)
  • Industrial sensors, PLCs, SCADA endpoints
  • Automotive ECUs with tight memory budgets
  • Medical and consumer IoT devices

Regulated & long‑life systems

  • Automotive, medical, industrial, energy
  • Devices requiring NIST‑standardized PQC compliance
External Dependencies
  • None
Deliverables
  • Software library (ML‑DSA verify)
  • Integration documentation
  • API reference
  • Test vectors

Evaluation packages are available under NDA for qualified manufacturers.

SGS certification logo
FortifyIQ AES Algorithm
AVA_VAN.5 Evaluation & Validation Summary
SGS Brightsight Common Criteria Laboratory
Summary. The leakage analysis (Welch t-test) on over 30 million traces did not show statistically significant first- and second-order differences between trace sets with fixed and random inputs. The template-based DPA analysis, on the pseudo-random trace set for the profiling phase (15 million traces) and on a sub-set of 300k fix input traces for matching phase targeting the first-round S-box output, and template attack on ciphertext, did not indicate any potential information leakage.”
“The results for the soft IP presented in the report were obtained on the TOE which is the basic hardware implementation of the soft IP without additional levels of security (e.g. that are present in a secure silicon layout). Therefore the internal strength of the soft IP itself was evaluated. This indicates that the investigated features and parameters of the soft IP implementation should be robust against SCA and fault injection attacks in different implementations including ASIC. Nevertheless, according to the Common Criteria rules, the strength of the final composite product must be evaluated on its own
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