FIQ-PQC01-SW ML-KEM SW Library

Compact and Secure Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation SW Library for Resource-Constrained Devices

As classical asymmetric encryption and secure key establishment algorithms face obsolescence in the quantum era, embedded systems require quantum-resistant alternatives that balance performance, code size, RAM size, and power consumption. FortifyIQ’s ML-KEM SW library answers this need with a compact and efficient implementation of the ML-KEM key encapsulation scheme, enabling secure shared key establishment, standardized in FIPS 203 based on the CRYSTALS-Kyber scheme. Designed for secure SoC integration, it supports all security levels of the ML-KEM algorithm and incorporates comprehensive protections against side-channel injection attacks. The IP core is engineered to meet or exceed rigorous certification standards, including FIPS 140-3 and Common Criteria, enabling future-proof authentication for secure embedded applications.

Features

  • Efficient Performance
  • SCA and FIA Protections
  • Security Certification Readiness

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External Dependencies

• Requires an external true random number generator (TRNG)

Applications

  • IoT Devices
  • Automotive Systems
  • Embedded and Industrial Control
  • Authentication Tokens
  • Payment Systems
  • Secure Communications
  • Network Devices

Deliverables

  • Software library 
  • Documentation

Related Products

Fortify’s AES security evaluation by SGS

“Summary. The leakage analysis (Welch t-test) on over 30 million traces did not show statistically significant first- and second-order differences between trace sets with fixed and random inputs. The template-based DPA analysis, on the pseudo-random trace set for the profiling phase (15 million traces) and on a sub-set of 300k fix input traces for matching phase targeting the first-round S-box output, and template attack on ciphertext, did not indicate any potential information leakage.”

” The results for the soft IP presented in the report were obtained on the TOE which is the basic hardware implementation of the soft IP without additional levels of security (e.g. that are present in a secure silicon layout). Therefore the internal strength of the soft IP itself was evaluated. This indicates that the investigated features and parameters of the soft IP implementation should be robust against SCA and fault injection attacks in different implementations including ASIC. Nevertheless, according to the Common Criteria rules, the strength of the final composite product must be evaluated on its own.”

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