FIQ-HMAC03B Zero Leakage HMAC-SHA256 Secure Core

High-Security SHA-2/HMAC Core with Zero Side-Channel Leakage (SHA-224/256 Only)

FortifyIQ’s High-Security SHA-2/HMAC IP core delivers formally proven zero side-channel leakage for SHA-2-224 and SHA-2-256 hashing and HMAC, making it ideal for security-critical embedded systems where resistance to physical attacks is non-negotiable. Targeted at applications willing to trade off performance and area for uncompromising protection, this RTL-level design is built with mathematically verified countermeasures against side-channel analysis. As with all FortifyIQ products, the protection is implementation-agnostic and integration-friendly, supporting systems aiming for the highest levels of Common Criteria and FIPS 140-3 certification.

Features

  • Efficient Performance
  • SCA/FIA Protections
  • Flexible Interfaces
  • Security Certification Readiness

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Applications

  • IoT Devices
  • Automotive Systems
  • Embedded and Industrial Control
  • Authentication Tokens
  • Payment Systems
  • Secure Communications
  • Network Devices

Deliverables

  • SystemVerilog source code or netlist
  • Testbench, input vectors, and expected results
  • Sample timing constraints, synthesis, and simulation scripts
  • Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) reference implementation
  • Integration, configuration, and usage manuals
  • Software library 
  • Security documentation

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Fortify’s AES security evaluation by SGS

“Summary. The leakage analysis (Welch t-test) on over 30 million traces did not show statistically significant first- and second-order differences between trace sets with fixed and random inputs. The template-based DPA analysis, on the pseudo-random trace set for the profiling phase (15 million traces) and on a sub-set of 300k fix input traces for matching phase targeting the first-round S-box output, and template attack on ciphertext, did not indicate any potential information leakage.”

” The results for the soft IP presented in the report were obtained on the TOE which is the basic hardware implementation of the soft IP without additional levels of security (e.g. that are present in a secure silicon layout). Therefore the internal strength of the soft IP itself was evaluated. This indicates that the investigated features and parameters of the soft IP implementation should be robust against SCA and fault injection attacks in different implementations including ASIC. Nevertheless, according to the Common Criteria rules, the strength of the final composite product must be evaluated on its own.”

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