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Protecting Quantum
Era Cryptography

Today

Classical public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC will become insecure once large-scale quantum computers are available. 
 


Attackers are already harvesting encrypted data today to decrypt later, once quantum computers become powerful enough to break these algorithms.

  • Classical public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC will become insecure once large-scale quantum computers are available.
  • Attackers are already harvesting encrypted data today to decrypt later, once quantum computers become powerful enough to break these algorithms.

To counter this threat, NIST has standardized post-quantum algorithms. 

ML-KEM (based on CRYSTALS-Kyber) and ML-DSA (based on CRYSTALS-Dilithium) in FIPS 203 and FIPS 204.

  • To counter this threat, NIST has standardized post-quantum algorithms. 
  • ML-KEM (based on CRYSTALS-Kyber) and ML-DSA (based on CRYSTALS-Dilithium) in FIPS 203 and FIPS 204.

The Problem

While post-quantum algorithms are mathematically resistant to quantum attacks, their implementations are highly vulnerable to physical attacks, including SCA/FIA attacks, sometimes exploitable with only a single trace.

Masking-based protection methods significantly increase performance, area, and power costs, and many such implementations have already been broken in academia.

The FortifyIQ Difference

FortifyIQ’s algorithmic hardening protects at the mathematical level of the implementation, providing certifiable SCA/FIA resistance without the overhead  of masking.

Algorithm from the family
proven in FortifyIQ’s AES cores, validated AVA_VAN.5  by a Common Criteria lab. ML-KEM-SW validated at 100,000 power traces with zero side-channel leakage for 1st and 2nd order.

Meets FIPS 203, 204, 205, NIST SP 800-208, and ETSI TS 103 619. FIPS 140-3 Levels 3,4, Common Criteria AVA_VAN.5, SESIP level 5.

Available as hardware IP, software libraries, or hybrid CryptoBoxes and roots of trust (including Caliptra-compatible compact and tunable RoTs), with PQC + classical cryptography for the migration period.

Compatible with existing RSA/ECC systems on legacy devices.

Secures any device or system, from
the smallest embedded controller to large-scale computing infrastructure,
without compromising efficiency.

Our SCA/FIA-hardened PQC software libraries (ML-KEM, ML-DSA) let you deploy quantum-safe security today on current devices to counter ongoing harvest-now/decrypt-later threats.

Start with our PQC or classical software libraries and migrate to our SCA/FIA-resistant hardware IP whenever ready, with zero changes to your application stack.

Both hardware and software PQC libraries are fully FOTA/OTA updateable, enabling in-field mitigation of newly discovered attacks.

FortifyIQ’s PQC hardware IPs, roots of trust, and Cryptoboxes are delivered as soft macros, making them independent of technology node and implementation, while its cryptographic software libraries are deployable over the air.

The FortifyIQ Difference

Outstanding PPA

FortifyIQ’s algorithmic hardening protects at the mathematical level of the implementation, providing certifiable SCA/FIAresistance without the overhead  of masking.

Validated security

Algorithm from the family
proven in FortifyIQ’s AES cores, validated AVA_VAN.5  by a Common Criteria lab. ML-KEM-SW validated at 100,000 power traces with zero side-channel leakage for 1st and 2nd order.

Compliant by design

Meets FIPS 203, 204, 205, NIST SP 800-208, and ETSI TS 103 619. FIPS 140-3 Levels 3,4, Common Criteria AVA_VAN.5, SESIP level 5.

Flexible deployment

ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and hash-based signature schemes such as SLH-DSA, XMSS / XMSS-MT, and LMS / LMS-HSS are available as hardware IP, software libraries, or hybrid CryptoBoxes and roots of trust (including Caliptra-compatible compact and tunable RoTs), with PQC + classical cryptography for the migration period.

Seamless migration to PQC

Compatible with existing RSA/ECC systems on legacy devices.

Secures any device or system

Secures any device or system, from
the smallest embedded controller to large-scale computing infrastructure,
without compromising efficiency.

Immediate PQC protection

Our SCA/FIA-hardened PQC software libraries (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, XMSS, XMSS-MT, LMS, LMS/HSS) let you deploy quantum-safe security today on current devices to counter ongoing harvest-now/decrypt-later threats.

Unified API for effortless HW migration

Start with our PQC or classical software libraries and migrate to our SCA/FIA-resistant hardware IP whenever ready, with zero changes to your application stack.

Updatable against emerging threats

Both hardware and software PQC libraries are fully OTA/FOTAupdatable. Crypto‑agility spans algorithms, parameter sets, and mitigations for emerging and new threats.

Silicon‑process‑agnostic

FortifyIQ’s PQC hardware IPs, roots of trust, and Cryptoboxes are delivered as soft macros, making them independent of technology node and implementation, while its cryptographic software libraries are deployable over the air.

FortiPQC
Cryptographic Library

FortiPQC-SW
Learn More

FortiPQC
Hardware Solutions

FortiPQC-HW
Learn More
FortifyIQ AES Algorithm
AVA_VAN.5 Evaluation & Validation Summary
SGS Brightsight Common Criteria Laboratory
“Summary. The leakage analysis (Welch t-test) on over 30 million traces did not show statistically significant first- and second-order differences between trace sets with fixed and random inputs. The template-based DPA analysis, on the pseudo-random trace set for the profiling phase (15 million traces) and on a sub-set of 300k fix input traces for matching phase targeting the first-round S-box output, and template attack on ciphertext, did not indicate any potential information leakage.”
“The results for the soft IP presented in the report were obtained on the TOE which is the basic hardware implementation of the soft IP without additional levels of security (e.g. that are present in a secure silicon layout). Therefore the internal strength of the soft IP itself was evaluated. This indicates that the investigated features and parameters of the soft IP implementation should be robust against SCA and fault injection attacks in different implementations including ASIC. Nevertheless, according to the Common Criteria rules, the strength of the final composite product must be evaluated on its own”
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