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D&R IP SoC Conference

  • December 2-3, 2025

Post-quantum algorithms ML-KEM and ML-DSA, based on Crystals Kyber and Crystals Dilithium, respectively, have been recently standardized by NIST in FIPS 203 and FIPS 204, and are rapidly being adopted worldwide.

  • December 2-3, 2025
  • Grenoble, France

SemIsrael Expo 2025

  • November 1, 2025

Post-quantum algorithms ML-KEM and ML-DSA, based on Crystals Kyber and Crystals Dilithium, respectively, have been recently standardized by NIST in FIPS 203 and FIPS 204, and are rapidly being adopted worldwide. Unfortunately, these algorithms are…

  • November 1, 2025
  • Airport City, Israel

FortifyIQ is the Finalist for the
Milipol Paris Innovation Awards

  • October 29, 2019

At Milipol Paris 2019, FortifyIQ has been selected to be one of the top three finalists of the Milipol Innovation Award in two categories: “Cybersecurity” and “Smart and Safe Cities.”

  • October 29, 2019
  • Milipol Paris, France

FortifyIQ Exhibiting at CHES 2019

  • August 29, 2019

NEWTON, MA – September 29, 2021 – There is a lot of secret data around us, some less valuable and some more valuable. The most valuable secrets, such as cryptographic keys, should be given the best possible protection – and that protection starts in hardware…

  • August 29, 2019
  • Atlanta, GA, USA
FortifyIQ AES Algorithm
AVA_VAN.5 Evaluation & Validation Summary
SGS Brightsight Common Criteria Laboratory
“Summary. The leakage analysis (Welch t-test) on over 30 million traces did not show statistically significant first- and second-order differences between trace sets with fixed and random inputs. The template-based DPA analysis, on the pseudo-random trace set for the profiling phase (15 million traces) and on a sub-set of 300k fix input traces for matching phase targeting the first-round S-box output, and template attack on ciphertext, did not indicate any potential information leakage.”
“The results for the soft IP presented in the report were obtained on the TOE which is the basic hardware implementation of the soft IP without additional levels of security (e.g. that are present in a secure silicon layout). Therefore the internal strength of the soft IP itself was evaluated. This indicates that the investigated features and parameters of the soft IP implementation should be robust against SCA and fault injection attacks in different implementations including ASIC. Nevertheless, according to the Common Criteria rules, the strength of the final composite product must be evaluated on its own”
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