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FortifyIQ's representative act as a speaker at D&R IP SoC Conference

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Yaacov Belenky

Chief Innovation Officer

Short Bio

Yaacov was born in the USSR, where he studied mathematics, and immigrated to Israel in 1987. Since 1998, he has worked in security, primarily at the hardware level, first at NDS (later acquired by Cisco), and subsequently at Intel (2017) as part of its red team. In 2020, he joined FortifyIQ as Chief Innovation Officer.

Since 2013, his research focus has been on physical attacks and algorithmic countermeasures against them. He is the inventor of 30 granted patents and the author of 6 academic papers, all in the field of security.

D&R IP SoC Conference Card

High-Assurance, Physically Secure and Crypto-Agile
ML-KEM and ML-DSA Implementations in Hardware and Software

Post-quantum algorithms ML-KEM and ML-DSA, based on Crystals Kyber and Crystals Dilithium, respectively, have been recently standardized by NIST in FIPS 203 and FIPS 204, and are rapidly being adopted worldwide. However, these algorithms are highly vulnerable to physical attacks, including side-channel attacks that can succeed with only a single trace. Masking-based countermeasures exist, but they introduce significant overhead in performance, gate count, and power consumption. Furthermore, a growing body of academic work has demonstrated practical attacks against masked implementations.

FortifyIQ has developed a unique algorithmic protection against physical attacks for both ML-KEM and ML-DSA, which is not based on masking and delivers significantly superior PPA compared to masking-based approaches. The method transforms computations into a large redundant domain, following the same core design principles as FortifyIQ’s AES protection schemes, which have successfully passed AVA.VAN.5 evaluation by a leading Common Criteria lab and are already deployed in millions of devices. This protection also extends to critical operations such as composition and decomposition, which are known to be particularly sensitive to side-channel leakage, and are not protected by standard masking techniques.

FortifyIQ provides a combined hardware + firmware solution. For already manufactured devices, or in cases where hardware constraints prevent full integration, FortifyIQ also offers software libraries for both ML-KEM and ML-DSA implementing the same underlying algorithmic protection. All products share a unified API.

FortifyIQ enables end-to-end crypto-agility across parameter sets and protection levels through over-the-air downloads, and even algorithm migration, through a consistent software-defined implementation path with a seamless transition to hardware acceleration via the same API. This ensures long-term adaptability without redesigning system integration layers.

In addition, FortifyIQ maintains outstanding benchmark results (available under NDA), demonstrating efficient operation even on highly constrained devices, enabling secure deployment across ultra-limited embedded environments.

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FortifyIQ AES Algorithm
AVA_VAN.5 Evaluation & Validation Summary
SGS Brightsight Common Criteria Laboratory
Summary. The leakage analysis (Welch t-test) on over 30 million traces did not show statistically significant first- and second-order differences between trace sets with fixed and random inputs. The template-based DPA analysis, on the pseudo-random trace set for the profiling phase (15 million traces) and on a sub-set of 300k fix input traces for matching phase targeting the first-round S-box output, and template attack on ciphertext, did not indicate any potential information leakage.”
“The results for the soft IP presented in the report were obtained on the TOE which is the basic hardware implementation of the soft IP without additional levels of security (e.g. that are present in a secure silicon layout). Therefore the internal strength of the soft IP itself was evaluated. This indicates that the investigated features and parameters of the soft IP implementation should be robust against SCA and fault injection attacks in different implementations including ASIC. Nevertheless, according to the Common Criteria rules, the strength of the final composite product must be evaluated on its own
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