Why Protecting Post-Quantum Cryptography Matters

FortiPQC Post-Quantum Cryptography

Classical public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC will become insecure once large-scale quantum computers are available. Attackers are already harvesting encrypted data today to decrypt later, once quantum computers become powerful enough to break today’s public-key algorithms.

To address this risk, post-quantum algorithms ML-KEM and ML-DSA, based on CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, respectively, have been recently standardized by NIST in FIPS 203 and FIPS 204, and are rapidly being adopted worldwide. However, these algorithms are extremely prone to side-channel and fault injection attacks, including side-channel attacks that require only one trace.

Masking-based approaches to the security of post-quantum algorithms have a significant cost in performance, gate count, and power consumption. And many of these masking-based protected implementations have been broken in academia.

FortifyIQ’s algorithmic solution follows the same design principles as FortifyIQ’s AES protection schemes, which have passed AVA.VAN.5 evaluation by a leading Common Criteria lab, and are deployed in millions of devices.

FortifyIQ provides FortiPQC, certifiable, attack-resistant post-quantum cryptography, compliant with FIPS 203/204/205, NIST SP 800-208, and ETSI TS 103 619.

Our implementations of ML-KEM and ML-DSA, as defined in the NIST PQC standards, are hardened at the implementation level, ensuring post-quantum algorithms’ resilience to side-channel and fault injection attacks across hardware, software, and hybrid deployments.

FortiPQC secures any device or system, from the smallest embedded controller to large-scale computing infrastructure, future-proofing security without compromising efficiency.

Features excellent PPA efficiency with robust protection against side-channel and fault-injection attacks.



Tunable to each deployment’s needs.
Ideal for future-proof security in embedded systems, chips, and chiplets.

Fortify’s AES security evaluation by SGS

“Summary. The leakage analysis (Welch t-test) on over 30 million traces did not show statistically significant first- and second-order differences between trace sets with fixed and random inputs. The template-based DPA analysis, on the pseudo-random trace set for the profiling phase (15 million traces) and on a sub-set of 300k fix input traces for matching phase targeting the first-round S-box output, and template attack on ciphertext, did not indicate any potential information leakage.”

” The results for the soft IP presented in the report were obtained on the TOE which is the basic hardware implementation of the soft IP without additional levels of security (e.g. that are present in a secure silicon layout). Therefore the internal strength of the soft IP itself was evaluated. This indicates that the investigated features and parameters of the soft IP implementation should be robust against SCA and fault injection attacks in different implementations including ASIC. Nevertheless, according to the Common Criteria rules, the strength of the final composite product must be evaluated on its own.”

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