IP Catalog

FortifyIQ offers a new generation of products, protected against SCA and FIA, which utilize proven, purely algorithmic, implementation-agnostic algorithms and deliver performance at least as fast as conventional unprotected versions.

FortifyIQ develops HW security IP cores fortified against Side-Channel (SCA) and Fault Injection attacks (FIA), while preserving the original AES goals of speed, low latency, and low power usage. We also offer high-performance software libraries and EDA tools for pre- and post-silicon security assessment.

All FortiCrypt products utilize masking methods based on finite field arithmetic that implement attack resistance without incurring extra latency costs.

Our core protection algorithm was tested rigorously, passing the Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) test at 1 billion traces, and was certified by a third-party Common Criteria lab. Our cores are fully synthesizable, eliminating the need for custom cells or special place & route handling. Being algorithm-based, they are technology-agnostic, ensuring compatibility and security across diverse platforms and devices.

HMAC SHA2 cores provide robust protection against SCA, DPA, FIA, and SIFA, are suitable for lightweight applications and are purely algorithmic and thus implementation-agnostic. Our products, including the software library, offer protection of HMAC SHA2, based on the threshold implementation approach, validated analytically and on physical devices.

A Public Key Algorithm coprocessor with modular multiplication and SCA and FIA protection that streamlines operations by eliminating Montgomery domain transformations, enhancing the coprocessor’s performance and reducing area.

A low-cost key exchanger for companies currently using preinstalled symmetric keys due to cost constraints, but are considering shifting to key exchange protocols based on asymmetric cryptography with built-in resistance to SCA and FIA.

Fortify’s AES security evaluation by SGS

“Summary. The leakage analysis (Welch t-test) on over 30 million traces did not show statistically significant first- and second-order differences between trace sets with fixed and random inputs. The template-based DPA analysis, on the pseudo-random trace set for the profiling phase (15 million traces) and on a sub-set of 300k fix input traces for matching phase targeting the first-round S-box output, and template attack on ciphertext, did not indicate any potential information leakage.”

” The results for the soft IP presented in the report were obtained on the TOE which is the basic hardware implementation of the soft IP without additional levels of security (e.g. that are present in a secure silicon layout). Therefore the internal strength of the soft IP itself was evaluated. This indicates that the investigated features and parameters of the soft IP implementation should be robust against SCA and fault injection attacks in different implementations including ASIC. Nevertheless, according to the Common Criteria rules, the strength of the final composite product must be evaluated on its own.”

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