Conference Papers
New:
STORM effectively solves the long-standing challenge of combining high security against SCA with low gate count and high performance for AES implementations by offering a different tradeoff (memory utilization) that may be preferable to RAMBAM in many practical cases. Unlike RAMBAM for which it is experimentally shown that the
leakage rapidly decreases as redundancy grows, but lacks a security proof (though the intuition behind this is explained), STORM has proven security. For applications with limited resources (e.g., IoT devices) STORM can be configured with a relatively small amount of SRAM, starting from 4 KB. For applications that require high performance (e.g., servers with intensive encrypted communications) the SRAM size is typically not a limiting factor, and the various advantages of STORM compared to other solutions are quite significant.
In this paper, FortifyIQ introduces Carry-based Differential Power Analysis (CDPA), a novel methodology that allows for attacking schemes involving arithmetical addition. This methodology is applied to what is believed to be the first published full-fledged attack on HMAC-SHA-2 which does not require a profiling stage.
Side-channel attacks pose a threat to cryptographic algorithms. HMAC is an important use case of a hash function, in which the input is partially secret and thus unknown to the attacker. Despite a few publications that discuss applications of power analysis techniques to attack HMAC-SHA-2, this is the first generic method that shows a full attack on its hardware implementation.
This is an academic paper describing a protection method for AES which is very efficient, and configurable for any application. It introduces RAMBAM, an innovative algebraic masking technique designed to protect against side-channel attacks and SIFA1.
